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You have some network and endpoint protection solutions.And of course you've disabled LM and NTLMv1 completely, allowing only the safer NTLMv2.And while this is an issue by itself, it leads to the more severe issue of NTLM being susceptible to replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.This can happen whenever a user authenticates to a server via NTLM.Even though it has not been the default for Windows deployments for more than 17 years, it is still very much in use, and I have not yet seen a network where it has been completely abandoned.In fact, it also supported by the latest version of Active Directory.by fooling Internet Explorer (or Edge) into authenticating to a server not in the local intranet by using a rogue img tag.
I hope this helps drive the message that NTLM is risky and should be used with caution (if not totally restricted) in your organization’s network.All NTLM versions use a relatively weak cryptographic scheme.While I agree none of the weaknesses are deal breakers, they do make it relatively easier to crack hashes and achieve plaintext passwords.The challenge with having NTLM in your network is that it is easily exploitable and puts an organization at risk for a breach.
In this blog, I’ll discuss why NTLM is risky, as well as some of the best ways to mitigate these risks.
[Update: If you are interested in seeing how Preempt can help you get a handle of NTLM, check out this video - and download our whitepaper here.]Now for the really interesting stuff.